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• Research and development spending has risen rapidly in Asia, particularly in
China, which is now the world’s second R&D spender behind the United States.
The increase in Korean and Chinese patent applications has been even more
rapid, but Chinese patenting for exploitation on the main markets for innova-
tion (the European Union, Japan and the US) is still marginal.
• Asia's increased innovation spending is most prominently related to informa-
tion and communication technologies. Overall, the Chinese and Korean econo-
mies are still not specialised in knowledge-intensive goods and services.
Furthermore, China in particular is not (so far) capturing much value from its
role as a manufacturer and exporter of high-tech goods; China remains mostly
an assembler of goods, the value of which is created elsewhere.
• It would be wrong to ignore China's innovation potential on the basis of its cur-
rent performance. Its clear innovation ambitions are likely to drive its future
growth.
• Europe is struggling much more than the US to retain its place at the global inno-
vation table. The EU should use Asia’s capacity building in innovation as an
opportunity for value capture.
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1. Growth in nominal world-
wide R&D expenditures,
NSF (2012) on the basis of
UNESCO.
GROWTH IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SPENDING GLOBALLY has been vigorous, averag-
ing nearly eight percent annually during the last
five years1. An ever-larger group of governments
is making innovation a national priority. At the
same time, private R&D investment is also
increasing worldwide, and is growing more rapidly
outside the previously dominant centres of North
America, Europe and Japan.
This growing global public and private science,
technology and innovation capacity and capabil-
ity presents both opportunities and challenges to
Europe. Increased globalisation of science, tech-
nology and innovation resources offers opportu-
nities for cross-border collaboration. The pool of
researchers is larger, there is more potential for
utilisation of major foreign research facilities and
there are larger markets for innovative goods.
However, globalisation of innovation also chal-
lenges Europe’s competitiveness in high-technol-
ogy areas, and its position in critical science,
technology and innovation fields.
GLOBAL PATTERNS OF R&D EXPENDITURE: THE
RISE OF ASIA, IN PARTICULAR CHINA
Within the global growth of R&D expenditure, there
is a major trend of rapidly rising spending in Asia.
The R&D performed in Asia represented only 24
percent of the global R&D total in 1999. By 2009,
Asia accounted for 32 percent, compared to 34
percent for North America, and overtaking the EU,
which accounted for 23 percent total global R&D in
2009, down from 27 percent in 1999 (Figure 1).
This trend is even more striking when looking at
specific countries. The United States is by far the
biggest spender on R&D ($402 billion in 2009),
accounting for about 32 percent of the global total.
But the US share (not volume) is in decline, having
stood at 38 percent in 1999. The country making
the most spectacular inroad is China, which by
2009 was the second biggest spender ($154 bil-
lion), accounting for about 12 percent of the global
total. Its R&D expenditure is now similar to that of
Germany, France and Italy combined. Japan has
been pushed into third place, at 11 percent ($138
billion). The top-ranking EU countries spend less:
Germany ($83 billion, 7 percent), France ($48 bil-
lion, 4 percent) and the United Kingdom ($40 bil-
lion, 3 percent). Another Asian entry in the top
group is South Korea, representing 4 percent of
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Rest of world 15%
South Korea 2%
China 3%
Japan 14%
EU 27%
US 38%
Rest of world 18%
S. Korea 4%
China 12%
Japan 11% EU 23%
US 32%
Gross R&D expenditures, 1999 (world total $641bn)
Gross R&D expenditures, 2009 (world total $1276bn)
Average annual growth rate, 2000-09
US EU Japan China Korea
5.1 5.8 4.1 22.4 12.1
Figure 1: Global investment in R&D, selected
countries share of total, 1999 and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on National Science Foundation data
(NSF, 2012). Note: R&D expenditures are nominal, expressed
in $, PPP; 2009 data for South Korea estimated from 2008 on
the basis of average annual growth rate 2005-08. EU = EU27.
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the global total ($44 billion). Taken together, these
top seven countries account for about 71 percent
of total worldwide R&D expenditure (we will list
them as the Global Research 7 – GR7).
Italy ($25 billion) and Spain ($20 billion) do not
belong to the group of major R&D spending coun-
tries. The Scandinavian countries, Sweden, Fin-
land and Denmark, even when taken together, still
represent only $26 billion.
China’s current second position is a consequence
of spectacular R&D spending growth. The pace of
real growth in overall R&D in China from 1999-
2009 was exceptionally high at about 22 percent
annually. The rate of growth in South Korea's R&D
spend has also been relatively high, averaging 12
percent annually over this 10-year period.
By comparison, while the US remains top of the list
of the world's R&D spenders, its rate of growth in
R&D spending averaged 5 percent from 1999-
2009, which explains its relative decline (though
it still comprehensively outspends any competi-
tor). Growth in Japanese spending was even
slower, at an annual average rate of 4 percent. The
rate of growth during the same period for the EU
as a whole was 6 percent.
‘China’s R&D spending growth has been spectacular. The pace of real growth in overall R&D
expenditure in China from 1999-2009 was exceptionally high at about 22 percent annually. By
comparison, the US’s R&D spending growth averaged only 5 percent from 1999-2009.’
The major increase in Chinese R&D spending is
even more remarkable when compared to its
already impressive GDP growth rate. Trends in
R&D-to-GDP ratios (R&D intensity) express R&D
patterns relative to the size and growth of the
economy.
By this measure, Asia stands out as the region in
which R&D spending has grown faster than GDP,
resulting in a greater R&D intensity. China's R&D-
to-GDP ratio has more than doubled from 0.8 per-
cent in 1999 to be 1.7 percent in 2009, and is
almost on par with other GR7 countries, such as
the UK. Another fast Asian riser is South Korea,
which, together with Japan, is the GR7 country
with the highest R&D-to-GDP ratio, greater than 3
percent. In contrast to China and Korea, Japan’s
increase in R&D intensity is due to a slow down in
GDP growth below the growth in R&D expenditure.
The US has a high R&D intensity, but its growth in
R&D intensity has been much more modest.
The EU on average performs only modestly when
measured by R&D intensity: 1.9 percent in 2009,
well below the EU’s Horizon 2020 target of 3 per-
cent. This is despite the stellar Scandinavian per-
formances (Finland 4 percent, Sweden 3.6
percent, Denmark 3 percent), but due to some
large EU countries with low scores, such as Spain
(1.4 percent) and Poland (0.7 percent). Particu-
larly striking is Italy, which has an R&D intensity of
1.3 percent. Though a member of the G7, it is far
from qualifying for the GR7 group. The UK (1.9 per-
cent) and France (2.2 percent) also have relatively
low R&D intensities, and have exhibited only
modest increases in R&D intensity. Germany (2.8
percent) has increased its R&D intensity to be on
par with the US (Figure 2).
Some other R&D-intense Asian countries outside
the GR7 group are Singapore (2.3 percent) and
Taiwan (3 percent). India with 0.8 percent does not
belong to the club of Asian R&D tigers. The other
BRIC countries, Russia (1.24 percent) and Brazil
(1.1 percent), are also minor R&D players. 
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Figure 2: Gross R&D expenditures as % of GDP,
selected countries, 1999 and 2009
Source: Bruegel based on National Science Foundation data
(NSF, 2012). Notes: GERD = gross expenditure on R&D.
* South Korea, 1999 and 2008.
WHAT IS BEHIND ASIAN R&D SPENDING GROWTH?
The business sector is the main spender on R&D
in all GR7 nations. This does not diminish the
importance of governments as drivers of R&D
trends. Public investment in science and technol-
ogy is, when successful, an enabler of subse-
quent R&D performance within the private sector.
And the state influence in private companies can
be substantial.
The state as financier of R&D
Table 1 shows the share of total R&D expenditure
financed by the public sector. Perhaps contrary to
expectations, Asia has a lower share of R&D fund-
ing accounted for by the government than the US
and Europe. About 75 percent of Japan's total
national R&D came from the business sector. For
Korea it is 73 percent, and for China 72 percent. In
contrast, in the United Kingdom (33 percent), Ger-
many (28 percent), and United States (31 per-
cent) the share of state financing in R&D is high.
France has the largest public share among GR7
countries (39 percent).
The common conjecture that Asian R&D is mostly
government funded (or performed) is thus not
confirmed by the data. That of course does not pre-
clude the importance of government influence in
instigating private R&D. Many of China’s large pri-
vate companies are state controlled or influenced.
GR7 governments differ significantly in what they
spend their R&D budgets on, reflecting different
government R&D priorities (eg, defense, health,
general non-directed research) Comparable data
for China is unfortunately not available.
Defense has been for much of the past quarter
century, and continues to be, the focus of more
than half of the US federal R&D budget. France
also spends more than one quarter of its public
R&D budget on defense. Within the non-defense
federal US R&D budget, health has expanded dra-
matically and accounted for in 2009 more than a
quarter of the federal R&D budget. Japan is the
country with the highest government outlays on
energy R&D. South Korea concentrates its biggest
share on industrial technology. The ‘other’ cate-
gory includes general funding to universities,
which is typically non-targeted.
Overall the data does not support the notion that
the rise of Asia in R&D is driven by direct govern-
ment spending. It does show however a different
profile of sectors targeted by government-funded
R&D. And it does not exclude government influ-
ence in private sector R&D, particularly in China.
WHICH SECTORS ARE DRIVING ASIAN R&D
GROWTH?
Because businesses account for the largest share
of total R&D spending in most countries, differ-
ences in business structure go a long way to help
explain international differences in trends in R&D-
to-GDP ratios. Countries that specialise in dynamic
high-tech sectors (such as pharmaceuticals and
ICT) are more likely to also have higher and
THE WORLD INNOVATION LANDSCAPE: ASIA RISING? Reinhilde Veugelers
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
04
Government
spend as % of
total R&D
Share of government budget by objective (%)
Defense
Industr. prod.
& tech.
Health
Energy &
environment
Other*
US 31.3 51.6 0.6 26.7 2.7 18.4
Germany 28.4 5.7 12.7 4.8 7.2 69.6
France 38.9 28.3 8.6 7.1 8.7 47.3
UK 32.6 18.3 2.4 18.2 3.7 57.4
Japan 17.7 3.7 8.4 4 14.1 69.8
China 23.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Korea 25.4 16.7 26.5 8.7 12 36.1
Table 1: Share of government in R&D expenditure and government budget appropriations by socioe-
conomic objective, selected countries, 2009 or most recent year
Source: Bruegel based on National Science Foundation (NSF, 2012). Note: * Other (share of government budget by objective)
includes the non-targeted area of general advancement of knowledge (university funding) and other targeted areas such as
earth and space, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, education, culture, political systems.
increasing R&D-to-GDP ratios than countries in
which the business structure is weighted more
heavily towards slower growing low- or medium-
tech industries. Europe’s failure to increase its
R&D-to-GDP ratio is often attributed to its failure to
specialise in high-tech sectors (see for example
previous Bruegel Policy Briefs: Van Pottelsberghe,
2008, and Veugelers and Cincera, 2010).
Compared to the US, which has a broad spread
across sectors, smaller economies in Asia show
much higher concentrations of R&D spending in
particular industries. For example, in South Korea,
the ICT industry, which includes semiconductors,
accounted for 46 percent of the country's busi-
ness R&D spend. The share of ICT spending in Sin-
gapore and Taiwan is similarly big. The rise of the
Asian R&D tigers therefore correlates with the
industrial focus on R&D in the ICT sector.
A significant trend within the growth in US busi-
ness R&D spending has been the growth of spend-
ing by the service sector, accounting for 32
percent of all business R&D expenditure in 2009
(14 percent for computer-related services). Serv-
ices also account for about one quarter of all pri-
vate R&D spending in the UK. In Asia, the services
sector is still less predominant in business R&D,
representing 11 percent or less of spending in
Japan, China and South Korea. 
DOES THE GROWTH IN ASIAN R&D SPENDING
TRANSLATE INTO GROWTH IN ASIAN
INVENTIONS?
How efficient is the new Asian R&D investment?
Is it resulting in a new generation of inventions
and sources of growth?
Patents are regarded as a good proxy for
innovation, despite a wide-ranging debate on
whether they encourage or hinder innovation (eg
Harhoff, Scherer and Vogel, 2003). Given the
requirements for a valid patent (novelty, utility
and non-obviousness) they are an important step
as inventions progress towards
commercialisation. In addition, their licensing may
provide an important source of revenue. However,
not all inventions are patented. The propensity to
patent varies by industry and technology area. In
addition, patents suffer from a ‘truncation’
problem, with the most recent trends not
available, in view of the time it takes to process
patent applications. The patent data source that
suffers least from the time lag issue is Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications2.
In line with the rise in global R&D expenditure,
total PCT applications have been rising continu-
ously (6 percent average annual growth rate,
1999-2009). But within this overall rise in patent-
ing, there are significant regional differences
(Figure 3 on the next page). The dominant position
of the US in patenting is gradually eroding. While
the EU has been able to match, and even slightly
outpace, the US in patenting, it is, like the US, grad-
ually ceding share to Asia. Among Asian countries,
Japan is the most important patenting country,
and has consistently increased its share of PCT
applications. The rise of China is, like R&D expen-
diture, clear to see, albeit from a very low level.
Perhaps most notable in terms of patenting growth
is South Korea, which produces, despite its
smaller size, a similar number of patents to China. 
Table 3 compares the trends in countries' share of
global patents relative to R&D. A ratio greater than
1 (ie the country has a greater share of world
2. The Patent Cooperation
Treaty (PCT) provides a
framework for filing patent
applications to protect inno-
vations in each signatory
country. The PCT offers the
possibility to seek patent
rights in a large number of
countries by filing a single
international application
with a single patent office
(receiving office). Appli-
cants have an additional 18
months to decide whether
to seek a national or
regional (eg European
Patent Office) patent; if they
so wish, they must do so
within 30 months of the pri-
ority date (an average of 60
percent of PCT filings enter
the EPO regional phase).
The PCT procedure is
increasingly used for patent
applications, strongly corre-
lated with an increasing
number of contracting
states.  
Reinhilde Veugelers  THE WORLD INNOVATION LANDSCAPE: ASIA RISING?
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
05
Industry
France
2007
Germany
2008
Japan
2009
S. Korea
2008
UK 2008 US 2009
China
2009
Singapore
2009
Taiwan
2009
Pharma 14.3 7.4 10 2.4 27.2 15.9 3.2 0.6 1.4
Machinery & equip.: 52.2 67.7 59 73.1 37.1 n.a. 49.2 66.9 81.6
ICT 10.4 7.1 16.8 45.7 4.2 12.5 n.a. 59.4 53.1
Cars 14 32.8 15.6 13.2 7.9 4.6 n.a. 1.6 1.7
Services: 12.3 10.3 11.2 7.9 24.7 32.3 7.3 26.7 7.3
Computing 7 n.a. 2.1 3.4 9.4 14.2 n.a. 2 3
R&D 0.2 2.7 5.6 0.4 2.5 6.9 n.a. 9.5 0.5
Table 2: Private R&D expenditure by selected industry and country (%), most recent year.
Source: National Science Foundation (NSF, 2012).
patents than of world R&D expenditure) could be
interpreted as reflecting a more efficient R&D
process. One should however be careful in cross-
comparing patents and R&D; some countries
might have a specialisation in sectors with a
higher propensity to patent, such as pharmaceu-
ticals. Nevertheless, the trends in the ratio are
interesting, as industry structures do not change
quickly. Table 3 shows that the rise in patenting in
China, Japan and South Korea has outpaced their
increased R&D spending. For Japan and South
Korea, this has reversed a position whereby their
share of world R&D expenditure was much lower
than their share of world patenting. Their share of
world patents is now almost twice as high as their
share of world R&D expenditure. For China,
although its rising share of world patents has out-
paced its rising share of world R&D spending, its
share of world patents is still only half as large as
its share of world R&D spend.
IS THE INCREASE IN ASIAN PATENTED INVENTIONS
MAINLY AN INCREASE IN LOW-VALUE PATENTS?
There is a huge heterogeneity in the quality of
patent applications. Only a small minority of
patents prove to be of high value. Harhoff, Scherer
and Vogel (2003), for example, estimated for dif-
ferent samples of company and university
patents, that 10 percent of the patents were
responsible for 48-93 percent of the total eco-
nomic returns. If the growth in total patent appli-
cations from a country is concentrated in the long
tail of low-value patents, there may be limited
innovation-based value creation.
There are various indicators used in the literature
to measure the value of patents3. The measure we
use is triadic patents, ie patents that are applied
for in all three major regions: the US, Europe and
Japan. Inventions for which patent protection is
sought in all of these markets are likely to be
viewed by their owners as justifying the high costs
of filing and maintenance.
The pattern and trends for triadic patents are dif-
ferent to those for all patents. The dominant posi-
tion of the US in triadic patents is not eroding over
time. Japan’s position in triadic patents also
remains strong. The EU, however, has a lower
share of triadic patents than overall PCT applica-
tions, and the EU’s share is declining rapidly.
Korea’s performance in triadic patents is similar to
its overall patenting performance, revealing no
3. Most of these measures,
such as forward citations
received, patent renewals or
opposition to patents, are
substantially correlated,
including our measure:
triadic patents.
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Figure 3: Countries’ shares of world PCT
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Source: Bruegel based on OECD. Note: country is by applicant;
measuring the country by the location of the applicant versus
the inventor for PCT applications gives very similar results.
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the JPO (Japan Patent Office) for the same invention.
US Germany France UK Japan China South Korea
1999 1.1 1.7 0.9 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.6
2009 0.9 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.8 0.5 1.9
Table 3: Patenting trends relative to R&D trends, % of world PCT filings relative to % of world R&D spend
Source: Bruegel based on OECD.
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specific high- or low-quality bias. China’s position
however is markedly different. The rise of China is
much less evident when triadic patents are con-
sidered, compared to the growth rate in overall
patenting in China. This indicates that growth in
the production of Chinese inventions does not so
far have a strong international orientation.
WHICH TECHNOLOGIES ARE DRIVING THE ASIAN
PATENT GROWTH?
The opportunities for technological innovation and
hence new patent applications vary substantially
across technologies. The ‘hottest’ areas with the
greatest scope for new technology developments
include biotechnology, ICT, nanotechnology and
clean energy. The dynamic patent performance of
countries – whether they increase or not their
share of global patents – will depend to a great
extent on how strong they are in these technology
growth areas.
The EU27 as an aggregate does not specialise in
any of the selected growth areas, with the recent
exception of nanotechnology, in which Germany
and France are building up a technology strength.
The UK specialises in biotechnology. In clean
energy, the EU does not yet hold a technology
advantage, although it is making progress.
Particular attention should be paid to the weak and
deteriorating position of the EU in ICT.
It is in ICT in particular that Asia is building up its
technology strength. This holds for Japan, South
Korea and China, and correlates with the concen-
tration of R&D investment in these countries in this
area, and their science focus on engineering,
physics and chemistry (Veugelers, 2011). Con-
fronted by this rising Asian ICT power, the US
remains strong in ICT, though its position is eroding.
In the other selected growth areas, the rise of Asia
is less clear-cut. Biotech is a clear US strength, and
is not an Asian relative stronghold. Nanotechnol-
ogy is still very much early stage and volatile in
terms of technology specialisation patterns. In
clean energy, Japan has a strong hold, although
this is gradually eroding, while South Korea is
building up a strong position in this field.
Although China has ambitions in all technology
growth areas, for the moment, it is only in ICT
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
US
EU27
France
Germany
UK
Japan
China
Korea
RTSCA in ICT, by PCT applications
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
US
EU27
France
Germany
UK
Japan
China
Korea
RTSCA in biotech, by PCT applications
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
US
EU27
France
Germany
UK*
Japan
Korea*
RTSCA in nano, by PCT applications
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
US
EU27
France
Germany
UK
Japan
China**
Korea
RTSCA in clean energy, by PCT applications
2000-04
2005-09
Figure 5: Trends in specialisation in selected technology growth areas by major regions, revealed
symmetric technology comparative advantage index (RSTCA), 2000-09 
Source: OECD. Note: for a description of the RSTCA calculations, see Annex 1. * fewer than 250 patents in both periods; ** fewer
than 250 patents during 2005-09. RSTCA in the nano sector for China has not been included because the number of patents
during the period is too small for a reliable estimate of the indicator.
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cialisation. The average for Europe masks signifi-
cant intra-EU heterogeneity. France, Germany and
the UK all specialise in KTI. South Korea has done
its catching-up and its KTI sectors have a similar
share to those in the EU and Japan (29 percent).
But like China, South Korea is still not specialised
in KTI sectors, although it is slowly progressing. 
When we single out ICT sectors (manufacturing
and services) within KTI sectors (Figure 6, panel
patents that it is realising its growth ambitions.
TRANSLATING INVENTIONS INTO ECONOMIC
VALUE CREATION
In this section we look at the impact of R&D spend-
ing and patents on countries’ competitiveness. We
examine the downstream effects of R&D spend-
ing and patent filings on the economies of the GR7.
For this analysis, the performance of the GR7 in
knowledge- and technology-intensive (KTI) sec-
tors is the target of interest, as these sectors are
considered to have a particularly strong link to sci-
ence and technology. It is in these sectors that the
impact from developments in science and tech-
nology is most strongly and most immediately
felt. For a definition of KTI sectors, see Annex 2.
We are particularly interested in whether the Asian
rise in share of world R&D spending and patenting
activity translates into an increase in Asian pro-
ducers and exporters of KTI goods and services.
KTI sectors are becoming more important for a
country’s economic performance because they
are responsible for a large and growing share of
total value added. Global value added from these
industries totaled $18.2 trillion in 2010 (NSF,
2012). This represents 30 percent of estimated
world GDP, compared with a 27 percent share of a
much smaller global economy 15 years earlier.
In addition, in many cases, KTI sectors develop
technological infrastructure that diffuses across
the entire economy. In particular, ICT is widely
regarded as a transformative ‘platform’ technol-
ogy, which is why we pay particular attention to
ICT in this section.
In common with the growth in science publishing,
R&D spending and patenting, Figure 6 clearly
shows that for all regions KTI sectors are taking an
increasing share of GDP. In 2009, KTI sectors were
by far most prominent as a share of the US econ-
omy (40 percent). The KTI sector share is lowest
in China (20 percent), and China is the least spe-
cialised in KTI sectors. Its emerging KTI sectors are
dwarfed by low-tech activities. The EU (32 per-
cent) and Japan (30 percent) are middling per-
formers in terms of the share of KTI sectors in their
economies, and they exhibit no particular spe-
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Figure 6: KTI sector trends
Source: Bruegel based on National Science Foundation data.
(NSF, 2012). Note: RSVCA (revealed symmetric value added
comparative ddvantage) index is positive when a country
specialises in KTI (ICT) sectors, as measured by having a
share in world value added of KTI (ICT) sectors that exceeds
its share in world valued added of all sectors. See Annex 1 for
a technical description. 
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B), we see that China has made progress and has
managed to develop a substantial specialisation
in ICT. Japan and Korea were already specialised in
ICT. Korea in particular has become more spe-
cialised over time. This increasing specialisation
of Asian economies in ICT should not come as a
surprise, given their major build up of science,
R&D and technology capacity in this area4.
Commonly used indicators for measuring the
competitiveness of nations in knowledge-
intensive sectors are their shares of high-tech
goods in total exports, their shares of world export
markets for high tech goods and their trade
balance in these sectors (see for example,
European Commission, Innovation Union
Scoreboard and Competitiveness Report; NSF,
2012). Table 4 shows the share of the world
market for high-tech goods of selected countries
and regions. It confirms China’s dramatic rise and
Japan’s fall, with Asia-8 (India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan and Thailand) consistently strong. The US
and EU have seen their shares of high-tech export
markets slowly erode. This is mainly explained by
ICT sectors. The EU and US remain the leaders in
pharmaceuticals.
Figure 7 shows the trade balance position for high
tech goods. It confirms the gradual erosion of the
positions of the US and the EU in high-tech goods;
both have built up a negative trade balance in
high-tech products, while China and the Asia-8
group have built up positive trade balances in
high-tech. Japan still has a positive trade surplus,
but this is slowly eroding. These shifts in trade
position are most apparent for ICT.
In trade statistics, the full value of the traded good
is credited to the source country. This creates a
distorted picture for those goods that are merely
assembled in the source country, and for which
high value inputs and components are imported
from other countries. The rise of global value
chains and international vertical specialisation
have made the foreign content embedded in gross
export flows increasingly important, leading to a
growing divergence between gross exports and
domestic value added exports (eg Koopman et al,
2010; IMF, 2011). Properly factoring in the import
content of exports would reduce the weight of the
countries where assembly is carried out. For
example, calculations on the basis of IMF (2011)
indicate that China’s domestic value added
exports in all sectors would only be 58 percent of
gross exports in 2005, for Korea, the figure would
ICT Pharmaceuticals All high-tech
1995 2010 1995 2010 1995 2010
United States 16.1 10 14.6 15.6 19 15.2
EU 11.2 6.9 47.6 44 17.3 15.7
Japan 22.1 6.7 4.3 2.3 19.2 6.5
China 6.5 31.4 3.5 3.9 6 22.3
Asia-8 36.3 36 3.5 6.4 27.3 27
Table 4: Shares of world exports of high-tech goods, selected countries, 1995 and 2010
Source: Bruegel based on National Science Foundation data (NSF, 2012). Note:  Asia-8 includes India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand. Among high-tech sectors, ICT accounts for 61 percent of all high-tech
exports. For a breakdown of knowledge-intensive sectors, see Annex 2.
4. The trends for high-tech
manufacturing sectors only
(not shown) are similar but
even more clear.
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Figure 7: Trade balance in high-tech goods and
communications and computers, selected
countries, 1995 and 2010, $ billions
Source: Bruegel based on National Science Foundation data
(NSF, 2012).
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be 59 percent, while for Japan, the EU15 and the
US, it is more than 75 percent.
This correction for foreign content holds particu-
larly for high-tech goods, because global value
chains are prevalent in high tech sectors such as
ICT, and much of the value of final products is
embedded in components and design.
Table 5 shows the foreign value added share in
gross exports for high tech goods. It shows that: i)
high-tech exports have a high share of imported
content, particularly in China and Korea (column
3); ii) for most countries the foreign value added
intensity is much higher in high-tech goods than
for the overall economy (column 4). This is partic-
ularly the case for China; iii) the foreign share in
high tech has been increasing over time for most
countries (columns 2-3), but especially in China
(no data for 1995 available for Korea).
All this suggests that the rise of China and to a
lesser extent Korea in high-tech exports and the
declining shares for the US, Europe and Japan,
need to be properly adjusted for the role these
countries play in international value chains of
high-tech goods, particularly ICT. The case of
Apple’s iPad is illustrative (see Annex 3). China,
which merely assembles and then exports the
final product is credited with the full value of the
factory price (plus shipping costs) in gross value
trade statistics, but its domestic value added,
being mainly an assembler, is tiny and hence its
contribution is much smaller than other countries
which supply inputs and manufacture
components.
Properly factoring in China’s role as the assembler
of high-tech goods and crediting exports to coun-
tries on the basis of their domestic value added
contribution would reduce the trade deficit that
many countries have with China5, particularly
those countries which design and produce high-
value components. At the same time, China and
other south-east Asian countries also manufac-
ture components for high tech goods that are
assembled elsewhere. In this case, these coun-
tries' value added is attributed elsewhere. IMF
(2011) analysis shows how the growth of high-
tech exports from the US, EU15 and Japan was
almost entirely driven by growth in foreign value
added and how significant China’s contribution
has been, through the manufacturing of interme-
diate components, to the growth of these coun-
tries's high-tech exports. All this signals the
significance of global value chains, with major
impacts on countries' trade structures, blurring the
analysis of export data for assessing competi-
tiveness. What matters is where value added is
created and where it is captured. On this, the case
of the Apple iPad makes clear the critical role of
who holds key property rights, and controls
design and marketing. In the iPad case the US still
captures the major part of the value added,
although it has almost entirely outsourced the
manufacturing, retaining only a small manufac-
turing base producing critical components. The
value captured by the US is mostly related to
design and marketing.
MAIN FINDINGS
A previous Bruegel publication, (‘A G2 for science’,
Policy Brief 2011/03), concluded firmly that China
is on the rise as a science powerhouse. Although
other countries, such as South Korea, are also
catching up, the Chinese emergence in science is
uniquely rapid, particularly in engineering, chem-
istry and physics. ‘A G2 for science?’ also docu-
mented a China-US connection which is virtuous,
mutually beneficially, so far robust and more or
less unique, predicting a future science landscape
that will look more like a G2 than a truly multipolar
system, with the attendant risk that Europe and
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China 20.1 48.5 1.77
Korea 46.3 1.21
Japan 10.0 21.5 1.41
US 16.6 17.4 1.62
France 29.1 29.2 1.07
Germany 24.1 31.2 1.12
UK 33.6 32.3 1.62
Table 5: Foreign value added in gross exports for
high-tech goods
Source: Bruegel based on IMF (2011).
5. Xing (2010), crediting
exports on the basis of
value-added contribution,
estimates that this would
reduce the value of China's
exports of Apple iPhones to
the United States in 2009
from an estimated $2 billion
to less than $100 million.
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other countries will be sidelined. Can we extend
this prediction into an emerging G2 for innovation
as well?
The evidence presented in this Policy Contribution
clearly shows that there is an increase in Asian
R&D investment. As in science, China is now the
second R&D spender, after the US, bypassing
Japan. Although the EU as a bloc spends more
than China, China has already the combined size
of Germany, France and Italy. Although China’s rise
is again very robust and rapid, and is likely to con-
tinue, in common with China's science growth,
other south-east Asian countries are also rapidly
increasing their R&D spends. This holds most
notably for Korea, while Japan is an incumbent
R&D stronghold and India is lagging. Most new
Asian R&D investment, even if it comes mainly
from the private sector, is backed by targeted
public support.
This growth in Asian R&D investment is translat-
ing into increasing patent filings. In fact, Asian
countries have grown even faster in patenting
than in R&D investment. But although the increase
in China’s share of world patent applications has
risen faster than its share in world R&D expendi-
ture, it is still only a minor player in patent terms,
with the same impact as much smaller Korea. And
when looking at the most valuable inventions, ie
those for which patent protection in sought in all
major world markets, China's share remains tiny. 
This Asian growth in R&D spending and patents is
very much focused on ICT, an area with high tech-
nological opportunities and positive externalities
acting on other sectors. In other technologies with
high growth potential, such as clean technologies
and nanotechnology, the global playing field
remains open. World markets for pharmaceuticals
remain as dominated by the EU and US.
When looking at the economic value created by
innovative new goods and services, all of the
countries with major R&D expenditure are increas-
ingly concentrating their economic activities in
knowledge intensive goods and services. In this
respect, the US is the most specialised and China
the least, with the EU inbetween. Furthermore,
each region specialises in different high-tech sec-
tors. While the US and Europe relocated ICT manu-
facturing to Asia, the services and the
pharmaceuticals sectors remain Western strong-
holds. China’s dramatic increase of exports of
high-tech goods, particularly ICT goods, might
seem impressive, resulting in widening EU and US
trade deficits with China for these goods. But as
the Chinese role is still mostly assembly, with less
value added contributed locally, China is not (yet)
capturing much value from high-tech manufac-
turing. It is not yet capitalising on its rising science
and technology capabilities in these areas. There
is still considerable scope for value capture of
clever foreign innovators, designing global value
chains, as the example of Apple’s iPad illustrates. 
Overall, although the Asian, and particularly, but
not uniquely, the Chinese rise in technology and
innovation is a real phenomenon, it is still far less
materialised than Asia's rise in science. Innova-
tion capacity is spread across more Asian coun-
tries than just China, resulting in a more multipolar
innovation landscape than in science. In addition,
China still has to prove itself as a developer of
high-value inventions for world markets, beyond
ICT manufacturing. And it still has to capture the
value from inventions beyond assembly.
It would be wrong to discount the Chinese innova-
tion potential on the basis of current performance.
China clearly has the ambition to become a world-
leading innovator, creating and capturing high-
tech value added, particularly in targeted areas.
But it would be equally wrong to see the rise of
China and other Asian countries in innovation – a
trend that is likely to continue – as a threat to
Europe. The innovation landscape is and should
be truly global, with innovators able to exploit sci-
ence, technology and manufacturing capacity and
serve new needs wherever they are located. Inno-
vation is furthermore not a zero-sum game.
Spillovers from innovation capacity wherever
located can be exploited by European innovators
in co-optition (a delicate balance between coop-
eration and competition) with Asian and American
innovators. Nevertheless, the opportunities that
the globalisation of R&D and innovation can offer
to Europe cannot be taken for granted. As the data
has shown, Europe is struggling more than the US
to build technology strongholds in knowledge
intensive goods and services, particularly in new
areas and with high quality new technology.
Europe needs to step up its investments in inno-
vation capacity if it wants to keep its seat at the
12
BR U EGE L
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION THE WORLD INNOVATION LANDSCAPE: ASIA RISING? Reinhilde Veugelers
global innovation table.  Although this is a call to
all European countries, it holds especially for
countries such as Italy as a large developed yet
low-innovating nations.
The most relevant issue for the EU is not so much
if Asia's science, technology and innovation
capacity will continue to increase, but who will be
able to use this capacity for value creation and
value capture? Corporate R&D and innovation is
highly concentrated in a few big global players.
How these firms react to and ride on the Asian sci-
ence and technology rise will be critical for
answering this question and hence assessing the
impact on Europe.
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ANNEXES
Annex 1: Revealed Comparative Advantage Index
Revealed Comparative Advantage Index (Balassa, 1965): a country’s share of world total in a sector
relative to the country’s share of the world economy:
Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage Index (Dalum et al, 1998):
RSCA= (RCA-1)/(RCA+1)
Annex 2: Knowledge-intense sectors
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has identified ten categories of indus-
tries that have a particularly strong link to science and technology.
• Five knowledge-intense service sectors that incorporate high tech either in their services or in the
delivery of their services: financial, business and communications services (including computer
software and R&D, and two non-commercial services: education and health services.
• Five high-tech manufacturing industries that spend a large proportion of their revenues on R&D and
make products that contain or embody technologies developed from R&D. These are aircraft and
spacecraft, pharmaceuticals, computers and office machinery, semiconductors and communica-
tions equipment, and scientific (medical, precision, and optical) instruments.
• ICT combines the High Tech manufacturing industries of computers and office machinery, com-
munications equipment, and semiconductors with the Knowledge Intensive services of commu-
nications and computer programming (a subset of business services). 
While production data are classified by industry affiliation of the firm, trade data are classified by prod-
uct or type of service. An export classified as a computer service may originate from a firm classified
as a computer manufacturer. Trade data also cannot provide a precise measure of where value is added
to a product or service. For example, China is credited with the full value (ie factory price plus shipping
cost) even when exporting a smart phone that was assembled in China with inputs and components
imported from other countries. Countries whose firms provide these high-value components and serv-
ices (design, marketing, software development, etc) are not credited for their contributions.
Annex 3: Who creates and captures the value of global high-tech products? The case of Apple’s iPad
(adapted from NSF, 2012)
Several case studies have attempted to estimate more precisely the geographic contribution of the
global value chain involved in the production of several high-tech goods. These studies show that the
greatest returns accrue to the firms and countries with design, engineering and marketing expertise
(see NSF, 2012, for further references).
The case of Apple's iPad (see table on the next page) shows that the United States receives 33 percent
of the retail price of the iPad, almost all of it (30 percent) consisting of Apple's gross profit.
RCA =                i = sector, j = country 
Xi,j
∑i Xi,j
∑i Xi,j
∑i,j Xi,j
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The estimated share for manufacture and assembly of components for the iPad is 23 percent, largely
apportioned to South Korea with smaller distributions to Japan, Taiwan, the EU and the US. China, the
location of final assembly, receives an estimated two percent share of the iPad's price. China's value
added is very small because final assembly of these products requires only a few minutes and China's
wages for assembly workers are (still) very low compared to those in more developed countries.
Value chain of Apple iPad, by location and activity: 2010
Characteristic Activity Location Amount/cost (US$) % of retail price
Distribution and retail Manufacturer’s suggested retail price Worldwide 499 100
Distribution Worldwide 75 15
Wholesale price (received by Apple) United States 424 85
Value capture Total value capture 238 47.7
U.S. total United States 162 32.5
Design/marketing Apple 150 30.1
Manufacturing of components U.S. suppliers 12 2.4
Manufacturing of components Japan 7 1.4
Manufacturing of components South Korea 34 6.8
Manufacturing of components Taiwan 7 1.4
Manufacturing of components EU 1 0.2
Manufacturing of components Unidentified 27 5.4
Direct labour Total direct labour 33 6.6
Labour to manufacture components Unidentified 25 5
Labour for final assembly China 8 1.6
Inputs Nonlabour costs Worldwide 154 30.9
Source: NSF (2012).
